The intertwined geopolitics and geoeconomics of hopes/fears:China’s triple economic bubbles and the ‘One Belt One Road’ imaginary by Sum, Ngai-Ling
1 
 
The Intertwined Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of Hopes/Fears: China’s Triple 
Economic Bubbles and the ‘One Belt One Road’ Imaginary 








This article adopts a discursive-cum-material approach to China’s new ‘One Belt One 
Road’ (OBOR) geostrategic imaginary and its development through the intertwining of 
geopolitics and geoeconomics of hopes and fears. It first contextualizes this 
development after the 2008 financial crisis when China promoted a vast stimulus 
package that inflated existing property and infrastructure bubbles and fuelled another 
in finance. Resulting debates over crisis management enabled an incoming President 
Xi to articulate a set of hope-based discourses that came to include ‘China Dream’, 
‘new normal’, and OBOR. Familiar cartographic statecraft techniques and novel spatial 
metaphors were used to promote OBOR’s allegedly ‘win-win’ strategy discursively. 
The OBOR imaginary was translated materially, and importantly, into policies that 
promoted a grand trans-regional ‘spatial fix’ to postpone China’s over-accumulation 
crises. This strategy is consolidating a China-oriented infrastructural mode of growth 
in production, financial and security. As this absorbs ever more productive and 
financial capital, we see the emergence of contradictions, antagonisms, and conflicts, 
especially in the use of bilateral loan-debt contractuality to appropriate strategic 
infrastructure. The article concludes with a call for an affective turn examining the 
intertwining of geoeconomics and geopolitics in the analysis of trans-regional spatial 
fixes. 
Keywords: Geoeconomics and geopolitics, hopes and fears, political economy, 
property and financial bubbles, loan-debt investment, infrastructural mode of growth, 
China, One Belt One Road  
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This article proposes a discursive-cum-material approach to the 2013 launch and later 
development of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR)1 geostrategic imaginary. The 
analysis unfolds in six steps. First, theoretically, it suggests that geostrategic 
imaginaries articulate geopolitics and geoeconomics and can be fruitfully related to the 
discourses of hopes and fears. Second, historically, it relates the OBOR imaginary to 
domestic issues in China following the 2008 financial crisis as the economic slowdown 
challenged the government’s target of maintaining an 8 percent growth rate. 
Responding to this challenge and the resulting threats to employment, the leadership 
launched a vast stimulus package in that year. Yet, this intensified the property, 
infrastructure and, later, financial bubbles. These problems continued after the 2013 
transfer of leadership from President Hu and Premier Wen to President Xi and Premier 
Li. Third, anticipating major economic reforms, a new term, ‘Likonomics’, was floated 
but was soon superseded by Xi’s hope-based ‘new normal’ discourses with the OBOR 
imaginary as its linchpin. Fourth, discursively, this imaginary built on China’s existing 
‘Go Out’ and ‘Go West’ policies and constructed a new trans-regional scale of 
connectivity and win-win solutions via cartographic statecraft and 
geoeconomic/geopolitical tropes. Fifth, drawing on the notion of spatial fix, it examines 
how the translation of this imaginary into policies contributes to the building of a China-
oriented infrastructural mode of growth based on three emerging governance 
configurations for production, finance and security respectively. As this mode of growth 
absorbs more and more production and financial capital, it is also prone to 
contradictions, conflicts and antagonisms. Sixth, highlighting key features of the 
OBOR case, the article explores the articulation of materiality and discourse in the 
making of spatial fixes at the interface of geopolitics and geoeconomics as these are 
shaped by openly voiced hopes and fears. 
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GEOSTRATEGIC IMAGINARIES AND THE INTERTWINING OF HOPES AND FEARS 
 
Geostrategic imaginaries and projects such as OBOR reflect the increasing global 
entanglement of geopolitics and geoeconomics (Sparke, 2014). Such imaginaries and 
their translation into policies and practices invite a critical discursive-material 
perspective (Sum and Jessop, 2013) on the interrelations among politics, economics 
and sociospatiality (Elden, 2013). Geopolitically, this includes how intellectuals of 
statecraft (cf. Foucault, 1980, 2008), such as foreign policy advisors, construct new 
geostrategic imaginaries in policy discourses. Literature on critical geopolitics 
indicates that most foreign policy discourses rest on spatial/scalar narratives and 
imaginaries that tend to deploy binaries such as East/West, them/us, and hopes/fears 
(e.g., Ashley, 1987; Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Campbell, 1998; Dalby, 1991). This 
perspective is echoed in critical geography (e.g., Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Ó 
Tuathail and Agnew, 1992) as its proponents seek to overcome the state-centric 
territorial trap (Agnew, 1999) by exploring: (1) the complexities of spatialization and 
rescaling in regard to new state spaces; cross-border regions, military developmental 
statecraft (e.g., Brenner, 2003; Gregory, 2008; Jessop, 2008, 2016; Paasi, 2004; 
Perkmann and Sum, 2002); and (2) territorially-relevant subjectivation and identity-
building in the core (Campbell, 1998) and periphery (e.g., Essex, 2013; Sparke, 2007; 
Sum, 2013). 
 
The same critical perspective is pertinent to geoeconomics. The latter was first 
mapped for the post-Cold War period by a security consultant, Edward Luttwak (1990), 
who claimed that civilian innovation potential, international trade, and market 
penetration would replace military power as the dominant mode of world ordering. This 
would create new hierarchies among nations. This approach was criticized for: (1) 
translating the realist mind-set from Cold War politics to post-Cold War economics (Ó 
Tuathail, 1996, p. 239); (2) exaggerating national conflicts and ignoring transnational 
integration, global networks and interconnectedness (e.g., Ohmae, 1990); and (3) 
overlooking the remaking and intertwining of geoeconomic/geopolitical discourses and 




Building on these heuristically powerful critical insights, this article explores the 
contingent intertwining and enmeshing of geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses 
and practices with reference to the Chinese case. It highlights how the spread of the 
2008 global financial crisis led Chinese intellectuals of statecraft to search for new 
geoeconomic and geopolitical imaginaries and associated policies in displace some 
of the crisis tendencies. These imaginaries typically selectively articulate academic 
theories, policy rhetoric, and media narratives. They often emotionalized hopes and 
fears that frame, script and spectacularize possible spatial connectivity, links and flows 
among places, across scales, and over distance (cf. Essex, 2013, p. 3). These 
sociospatial scripts provide ordering logics, mental models, metaphors/tropes, and 
discursive devices that shape identities, guide spatial/scalar strategies and orient 
alliance and coalition building with unintended, uneven, and often contradictory 
sociospatial effects. 
 
Matthew Sparke (2014) noted that such a theoretical approach to the remaking of 
sociospatiality requires a ‘double vision’2 that focuses on the performative power of 
geopolitics and geoeconomics and their respective links to fears and hopes (Sparke, 
2005). Highlighting the latter aspect, my analysis deepens Sparke’s critical perspective 
by drawing on affect studies (AHMED, 2004; Massumi, 2002) and critical foreign policy 
analyses (e.g., Booth and Wheeler, 2008). For the affective turn in social sciences, 
hopes/fears involve individual psychology and emotionally charged discourses 
(Chaput, 2010, pp. 4–8). For example, in the USA after 9/11, discourses on the ‘War 
on Terrorism’ emotionalized and spectacularized geopolitics by stoking security fears 
and seeking to make the ‘war’ global (Ahmed, 2015). Similarly, under neoliberalism, 
the geoeconomic hope of freeing markets on a global scale energizes investors, 
producers and consumers as they reorient their horizons of action for global capital 
accumulation and incessant personal gratifications. Similar hopes and fears emerged 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis as countries like China started to worry 
about economic slowdown from its ‘8-percent growth rate’. Beginning in 2013, this 
motivated the party leadership to promote hope-based new imaginaries, e.g., ‘China 






THE 2008 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CHINA’S TRIPLE BUBBLES 
 
China’s drive for continued growth was reinforced by its WTO entry in 2001. This 
facilitated an export boom and China’s emergence as a ‘global factory’ enjoying 
growing trade surpluses and rising foreign currency reserves. This expansion was 
constantly threatened by poor labour conditions; overproduction of raw materials and 
consumer goods; environmental degradation; and the risk of depreciation of its huge 
foreign reserves. The global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 aggravated these 
challenges. Exports fell for the first time since 2001, many coastal export firms closed, 
and unemployment surged. China’s investment in US Treasury Bills, which was 
around USD 1.9 trillion, suffered losses as the dollar depreciated. The US bear market 
also hurt Chinese banks and fund companies that were heavily invested in Wall Street 
(Sun and Fu, 2012). In short, this crisis provoked an over-accumulation crisis (Marx, 
1998, pp. 237–258, 438-–439, 483 and passim) and threatened the party’s 
‘performance legitimacy’ (Zhao, 2009), which partly relied on rapid growth in gross 
domestic product (hereafter GDP). 
 
China’s ruling logic of GDPism 
 
GDPism denotes ‘the belief that rapid GDP growth should always be the nation’s 
highest priority because it is the panacea for most national issues and the way to 
consolidate the government’s legitimacy’ (Qi, 2010, p. 5). This mode of rule has 
dominated Chinese policy from the start of its 1978 open door policy. Thereafter the 
mantra of ‘protecting and maintaining an 8% GDP growth rate’ (bao ba) was a 
mainstay of official rhetoric and a crucial policy benchmark under Premier Deng 
Xiaoping. It was narrated that 8% is ‘necessary to maintain social stability and provide 
jobs for tens of millions of new laborers swarming into the country's crowded job 
market every year’ (China Daily, 2009). Party leaders and local government officials 
reiterated this mantra to sustain the party’s goal-based ‘performance legitimacy’ and 
their own achievement in GDP terms (Sum, 2013 and 2017). 
 
GDPism operated as powerful discursive apparatus to normalize a regime of truth and 
guided the party’s efforts to manage the economy, politics, and wider society. Its 
associated political arithmetic required constant concern with threshold maintenance 
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and management to secure national stability. It entailed (1) constant comparison with 
the 8 percent benchmark; (2) distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable policy 
actions; and (3) regulating conduct by reference to the technical requirements of 
economic performance. Government units and cadres at national, provincial, city, 
prefecture and county scales monitored their performance against the benchmark and 
internalized and applied its logic in their own practices. For example, cadres competed 
to showcase their urban development icons (e.g., high-speed train lines, airports, and 
concert halls) and growth rates in bureaucratic beauty contests (Hsing, 2010). 
 
The stimulus package and land- and debt-based accumulation 
 
Rising unemployment and social unrest following the global financial crisis called into 
question this GDP logic. In November 2008, the Hu-Wen party leadership sought to 
re-ignite growth with a four trillion Renminbi (hereafter RMB) stimulus package 
(equivalent then to 560 billion USD). To facilitate this package, central government 
relaxed its credit policies and encouraged lending by state-owned banks (SOBs). 
National ministries and sub-national government units seized this chance to win 
approval for their pet infrastructural projects. However, to this end, (sub-)national 
governments had to provide matching funding and did so by intensifying the 
acquisition of land and leasing land use rights (Wu, 2015, p. 20; see also Lin, 2014; 
Wu, Xu and Yeh, 2007). 
 
Furthermore, as sub-national authorities were prohibited from raising additional funds 
without central government approval, they established local government financial 
vehicles (LGFVs) to collateralize land-use rights and raise money from SOBs and the 
shadow banking system (Hsu, 2015).3 These funding sources included securitized 
corporate funds, real estate investment trusts, and wealth management products for 
sale to private and public investors. Sub-national authorities also allied with private 
developers and auxiliary building industries (e.g., cement, steel, bricks, and heavy 
machinery). The resulting growth coalitions co-leveraged land and property for 
lucrative megaprojects and other real estate ventures, increase extra-budgetary 





Triple Bubbles and Challenges of Over-accumulation, 2010-2015 
These measures, together with the emergence of commercially developed housing 
since 1994, aggravated the existing ‘property bubble’. For example, prices in major 
cities such as Beijing and Shanghai rose 3.65 and 3.41 times between 2003 and 2013, 
respectively (Xinahuanet.com 2013). Much of this land- and property-based 
accumulation was fuelled by debt as: (1) local governments/LGFVs raised loans via 
collateralization from the shadow banking system; (2) state-owned and private 
property developers borrowed from SOBs and shadow banking system (Hsu 2015), 
and (3) households financed real estate purchases via mortgages, savings and 
leveraging equity. According to National Audit Office data, LGFV debt more than 
doubled from RMB 4.97 trillion at the end of 2010 (Lu and Sun, 2013, p. 6) to RMB 
10.9 trillion in June 2013 (China Daily, 2015a). Additionally, corporate (including state-
owned enterprises [SOEs]) debt was reported as 160% of China’s GDP at the end of 
2014 (Standard and Poor’s, 2015). The total of this debt plus central government and 
shadow banking borrowing was estimated to have increased from 150% of GDP in 
2008 to 282% by mid-2014 (Dobbs, Lund, Woetzel and Mutafchieva, 2015). 
 
The second crisis-tendency emerged as nearly half of new debt created in this period 
went into real estate development and infrastructure projects as well as auxiliary 
building industries. An infrastructure bubble became evident in empty estates, hardly-
used airports, highways to nowhere, and an oversupply of building materials. In 2014, 
the China Investment Network published a ‘ghost town index’ that identified around 50 
built-but-largely unoccupied cities (Coonan, 2014). Furthermore, reflecting some 7-
years’ worth of unsold housing stock in 2014, house prices fell nationally by 10% in 
2014 (Kolo, 2014). The slackening property and infrastructure boom aggravated 
overcapacity problems in related industries such as steel and cement, which produced 
half of world output in 2014. Annual cement capacity is 2.9bn tonnes; but 2012 
demand only reached 2.1bn (Kolo, 2014). Likewise, the steel industry produced about 
804 million tonnes and consumed only 664 million tonnes in 2015 (Lopez, 2016). 
 
These property and infrastructural bubbles spilled over into finance during 2013. 
Worried that increasing debts and overcapacity were endangering the entire financial 
system, central government intervened several times to tighten official credit. Shadow 
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banking further expanded as an alternative funding source, especially for vulnerable 
local governments and fragile local-government linked companies. The total local 
government loan portfolio was estimated at US$ 9tn between 2010 and 2015 
(Rasmus, 2015, p. 149) and this threatened to overwhelm local governments’ debt-
servicing capacity. The situation became worse thanks to growing defaults since 2012: 
notable cases include Huaxia Bank and CITIC Trust Co. These developments 
challenged the domestic logic of GDPism (Sum, 2017). In March 2015, the central 
leadership pre-empted a potential refinancing crisis by issuing a RMB 1 trillion quota 
to convert maturing high-yield debts into longer-term, lower-cost bonds. While this 
enabled local governments to save 1.5% of GDP in debt servicing, it created a vicious 
cycle of mounting debt, deleveraging, interest rate cuts, and debt swaps. 
 
These developments overlapped with the transfer of authority to the Xi-Li duumvirate, 
who sought to manage these crisis tendencies by promoting new policy imaginaries 
and backing them via new means. A prominent example is the eponymous 
‘Likonomics’. Its two aims were to rebalance the economy from investment to domestic 
consumption and promote financial liquidity (e.g., issuing bonds to refinance 
government debt; listing of SOEs on key stock markets, etc.) (Sekine, 2014, p. 5). 
Concurrently, the State Council and state media encouraged people to invest in the 
stock markets and thereby share in the ‘Chinese Dream’. New online networks linked 
to the shadow banking system offered instant access to credit for stock-exchange 
investment and allowed investors to buy on margin. Liquidity surged as over 90m retail 
investors joined the investing herd between 2014 and 2015 and reacted to the latest 
market and policy rumours. Between June 2014 and June 2015, initial public offerings 
(IPOs) for SOEs on the Shanghai Composite Index increased 2.5 times (Hu, 2015) 
and stocks rose around 150%. 
 
That this was unsustainable was shown by a plunge in the same index by 32% 
between 8 June and 8 July 2015. This financial asset bubble wiped out USD 3 trillion 
in (probably fictitious) equity value (Hu, 2015) with estimated losses per investor of 
RMB 420,000, equivalent to 8 years of an ordinary salary (Lam, 2015). Unsurprisingly, 
this triggered mounting complaints from retail investors and political panic for the 
leadership. Although the government intervened to postpone new IPOs and ordered 
government-controlled funds to purchase stocks and shares to boost prices, 
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Likonomics failed to dispel anxieties that the bubble would burst. Paradoxically, then, 
efforts to stamp out earlier property and infrastructural bubbles spilled over onto the 
financial one. The interaction of all three bubbles highlighted China’s problems of over-
accumulation as expressed in excess capacity, inflated property prices, profit squeeze, 
rising debt, and falling growth rates (Chesnais, 2014, p. 74). 
 
The geoeconomic unease of falling GDP growth rates since late 2015 
 
China’s GDPist target of 8% growth rate yearly has been in the spotlight with the 
accumulation of the triple bubbles. They have caused unease at the heart of the 
leadership, threatening its performance legitimacy, and provoked geoeconomic and 
geopolitical uncertainties abroad about the global impact of a possible Chinese ‘hard 
landing’ (Oliver, 2016). Much nervous energy was invested (trans-)nationally in 
predicting and monitoring the deviation of growth from the new 7% benchmark set in 
2014. Decimal points below 7% prompted debates about the geoeconomic risks and 
threats of China’s performance both at home and abroad (Magnier, 2015). For 
example, Premier Li himself tried to finesse the meaning of falling growth rates in a 
speech at the opening of the National People’s Congress in March 2016. Instead of 
stating a single number, he mentioned a range between 7% and 6.5%, creating room 
for manoeuvre. Despite efforts to manage the triple bubbles, Li’s rescue of the financial 
asset bubble was called into question. He was gradually marginalized in economic 
decision-making while President Xi was jostling to control the party-state hierarchy 
(Lam, 2014). 
 
XI’S ‘NEW NORMAL’ DISCOURSE: HOPE, CONTAINMENT, RE-PROGRAMMING 
 
As ‘Likonomics’ faded Xi’s hope-based discourse of a ‘new normal’ gained traction. 
He used this more fluid narrative to signal slower but higher-quality growth. The ‘new 
normal’ discourse, which was first introduced in 2010 by a giant California-based bond 
fund, Pacific Investment Management Co. (PIMCO), offered a new post-crisis rhetoric 
to narrate below-average economic growth. Xi first endorsed it publicly on an 
inspection tour to Henan Province on 9 May 2014 and an official website hyped this 
affirmation as ‘one of the hallmarks to be engraved in history’ (Chinese Executive 
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Leadership Academy Jingangshan, 2014). Inspired by PIMCO, Xi selected this fluid 
discourse to manage public expectations and reassure confidence in face of the 
bubbles and the slackening Chinese growth. 
 
This ‘new normal’ discourse condoned a decelerating economy and recalibrated 
GDPism as the previously benchmarked 8% annual growth target was replaced by a 
lower target range. This also helped to subsume old and new policy objectives under 
a single rubric. This now included financial reforms (e.g., liberalization of interest rates, 
internationalization of the Renminbi; and greater exchange rate flexibility); increased 
household consumption; changes in budget laws to allow local governments to issue 
debt; promotion of high-value-added manufacturing and service industries; introducing 
mixed ownership for some SOEs to enable them to compete internationally; crack-
downs on corruption; improvement of people’s well-being; promoting the OBOR 
geoeconomic initiative; and resetting Sino-American geopolitical relations. 
 
The catchall meaning of the ‘new normal’, interpreted in neo-Foucauldian terms, 
suggests a crisis-management discourse oriented to remaking party-state legitimacy 
despite a decelerating economy. As a wide-ranging discourse, it reorganizes and 
regularizes official power and helps to accommodate personal ambitions and identities 
to slower growth via two discursive technologies. First, a technology of containment 
recalibrates the number order embedded in GDPism, lowering growth expectations for 
the coming 5 years to 6.5% and thereby managing expectations. Second, a technology 
of re-programming strategically recodifies policy discourses to normalize a new 
governmental rationality (Dean, 1999) that claims that higher-quality growth can 
compensate for slower growth now and promotes prospect for a brighter future thanks 
to a mix of revamped and new policy objects and instruments that will become ‘growth 
drivers 2.0’. This new hegemonic vision and related accumulation strategy enables 
party leaders, especially Xi, to reboot their image, marginalize ‘Likonomics’, create 
new policy imaginaries that can alter subjectivities and aspirations, and reorganize 
time, scale, place, space and knowledge in hard times. The OBOR initiative is a 
linchpin of the ‘new normal’ because it envisages a new (trans-)regional scale to 
manage over-accumulation problems. This offers what Harvey (1982) describes as a 
‘spatial fix’ in which new spatial arrangements are created to enable capital (including 
state capital) to annihilate space with time (Marx, 1973, pp. 320 and 330) and displace 
11 
 
its debt-laden overcapacity crises abroad through the production of a trans-regional 
scale of actions (Summers, 2016). 
 
HOW OBOR PRODUCES A TRANS-REGIONAL SCALE AND PROGRAMMES HOPES 
 
The production of this new spatial scale is mediated, discursively, through the OBOR 
imaginary. It was co-produced and spectacularized by the party leadership, policy 
elites from different ministries, planning institutes, think tanks and policy banks that 
project a better future. Seeking to energize this vision, Xi’s ‘China Dream’ and ‘new 
normal’ discourses deployed the historical metaphor of the ‘Silk Road’ that, under the 
Han and Tang dynasties, had stretched from China’s old capital Xi’an to ancient Rome 
(Clover and Hornby, 2015). The symbolism of this historical ‘trade routes’ and ‘cultural 
exchanges’ translates the past aura of wealth and cross-border connectivity into the 
present conjuncture. 
 
Cartographic statecraft to create trans-regional connectivity 
 
The present hope-based discourses on connectivity are represented and programmed 
via two spatial metaphors. The ‘One Belt’ denotes the land-based ‘Silk Road Economic 
Belt’ and the ‘One Road’ is the sea route of the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. This 
imaginary was first officially announced by Xi in a speech at Nazarbavev University in 
Kazakhstan on 7 September 2013. He announced the maritime component in the 
Indonesian Parliament on 3 October in the same year. Like most Chinese policies, 
announcements of new policy concepts by top leaders are subsequently translated 
into detailed official documents by policy-academic communities (Zheng, 2016). 
OBOR became official policy when it was incorporated into the Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform in November 2013 and, again, into the State 
Council’s 2014 Report on the Work of the Government. A major document, Visions 
and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road, was co-authored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce 




In 2014, following the authorization of the initiative, the official Xinhua Agency 
published its OBOR map in Chinese and English (see Map 1). This map helped to 
visibilize and governmentalize the new spatial imaginary (Moore and Perdu, 2014; 
Pickles, 2004). Such meaning-making devices fuse the spatial hopes and cartographic 
simplicity in ways that are readily communicable by party leaders, diplomats, official 
presses, think tanks, consultancy firms, and other agents. Simple cartographic 
techniques such as territorial lines in primary colours (here, blue and orange) and 
nodal dots (here, cities/ports) translate the abstract idea of OBOR into a simple visual 
representation of a connected land-sea mass. The orange line scripted the ‘One Belt’ 
as a (trans)-regional land-based historical ‘Silk Road’ that stretches from China via  
 
Map 1 The Mapping of ‘One belt One Road’ by Xinhua 
 








Central Asia to Turkey, Russia and Continental Europe. Complementing this is the 
blue line of ‘One Road’ (or ‘Maritime Route’), which revives memories of the Chinese 
Empire’s seafaring prowess and power. The Belt now stretches from China via the 
Indian Ocean and Africa to the Mediterranean Littoral and Atlantic Seaboard. These 
two lines guide and naturalize the development of trans-regional connections between 
urban centres, sea ports, and regions in China, Asia, Europe and Africa that are tasked 
to perform economic and cultural mutuality that could: 
 
…. tap market potential, promote investment and consumption, create 
demand and job opportunities, enhance people-to-people and cultural 
exchanges, and mutual learning among the peoples of the relevant countries, 
and enable them to understand, trust and respect each other and live in 
harmony peace and prosperity (Xinhua, 2014: 2-3) 
 
Negotiating OBOR identity: geoeconomic and geopolitical metaphors and 
tropes 
 
The launch of the OBOR strategy in 2013 was prefigured domestically by two earlier 
official strategies initiated in the late 1990s under President Jiang. These were the ‘Go 
West’ and the ‘Go Out’ strategies. The former was to reduce the regional imbalances 
by encouraging investment in trade- and energy-related infrastructure (e.g. roads, 
hydropower plants, and telecommunications) in China’s western provinces, notably 
Yunnan, and autonomous regions such as Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. The 
latter strategy promoted investment abroad, especially by SOEs, to diversify China’s 
foreign reserves, exploit global opportunities, and develop new investment channels 
(on these strategies, see Wang, 2013). With the onset of the 2008 global financial 
crisis and the development of China’s own triple bubbles, these expansionary dreams 
and ambitions acquired new geoeconomic and geopolitical meanings as they were 
articulated with, and modified by, the OBOR imaginary.  
 
First, the ‘Go Out’ policy was originally justified in 2009 as a ‘Chinese Marshall Plan’ 
by Xu Shanda (the former director of China’s State Administration of Taxation). He 
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presented this plan to the Ministry of Commerce and suggested that China’s vast 
reserves be used to offer loans to developing countries that would then enlist Chinese 
SOEs to build major infrastructural and construction projects. These roundabout 
subsidies to Chinese industry would sustain Chinese exports, underpin high GDP 
growth rates, and reinforce the legitimating ideology of GDPism (on the latter, see 
Sum, 2013, 2016b). The ‘Chinese Marshall Plan’ trope triggered geostrategic 
discourses abroad when tied with OBOR. American think tanks (e.g., Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2015), foreign relation journalists (e.g., Tiezzi in 
The Diplomat, 2014) and global business media (e.g., The Wall Street Journal, 2014) 
suggested that OBOR as a ‘Marshall Plan’ would enable China to use its economic 
resources and capacities to secure its foreign as well as economic policy goals. 
Worried about the risks of translating this American Cold-War security-domination 
images to the OBOR initiative, Chinese official media and diplomatic circles selectively 
dismissed the relevance of the ‘Marshall Plan’ discourse to the OBOR project. For 
example, Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, speaking on 8 March 2015, stressed that this 
initiative was ‘a product of inclusive cooperation, not a tool of geopolitics, and must not 
be viewed in the outdated Cold War mentality’ (China Daily, 2015b). This interpretation 
of OBOR allowed China to communicate an inclusive and mutual identity rather than 
a self-serving and unilateral one (see Table 1). 
 
Narrated as a mutual initiative, connectivity on trade and investment can be improved 
via (trans-)regional infrastructural construction such as international trunk 
passageways, high-speed trains, seaways, ports, pipelines, information 
passageways, fibre-optical lines, low-carbon arrangements, etc. Familiar spatial 
metaphors such as ‘corridors’ and ‘gateways’ (see Table 2) are deployed to imagine 
possible linkages of these land and sea routes. With the building of mutual 
cooperation, service networks, industrial clusters, tourist hubs and heritage parks will 









Table 1 Construction of the ‘One Belt One Road’: Geoeconomic and 

















 ‘Go West’ and ‘Go 
Out’ Policies 
 
 ‘Chinese Marshall 
Plan’ 
 





Extension of the ‘Go West’ 
and ‘Go Out’ Policies in the 
contexts of China’s triple 
crises and the Xi’s ‘China 
Dream’ and ‘New Normal’ 
 
Negotiation of OBOR’s 
identity with reference to US 
Marshall Plan 
 
Focus on building 
infrastructural-oriented 
networks based on 
‘mutuality’ and ‘connectivity’ 
(not domination as in the 








Historical metaphor of the ‘Silk Road’ 
 
The use of cartographic statecraft such as 
maps, territorial lines and dots  
 
Joining these lines and dots to create the 
OBOR space to the west of China 
 
Mapping the ‘One Road’ and ‘One Belt’ as 
a land-sea mass that covers China, Asia, 
the Middle East, Europe and Africa  
 
Constructing mutuality and connectivity via 
the building of (trans-)regional 
infrastructure such as highways and ports 
 
Using geographical planning metaphors 
such as corridors and gateways to frame 







Trope of Mackinder’s 
‘Heartland theory’ 
 
Trope of ‘community of 






Construction of ‘West Pivot’ 
in the contexts of China’s 
more assertive ‘Peaceful 
Rise’ 
 
‘Pivot West’ and the ‘Eurasia’ 
imaginary as offering 
opportunities   
 
Building community of 
common destiny with  
Central Asia, EU and Russia 





Metaphors of mutuality and cooperation 
(and not imperial domination) 
 
Denouncing and distancing from 
Mackinder’s space-conquering analogy in 
framing OBOR 
 
Disarticulating OBOR from Mackinder’s 
theory and rearticulating the ‘Eurasia’ 
imaginary in mutual geoeconomic and 
geostrategic terms 
 
(Source: Author’s own compilation) 
 
 
trade, production, finance, communication, logistics, and tourism. This project is 
mapped to cover 65 countries with a total population of 4.4 billion people with a 
16 
 
disposable income of around US$ 21 trillion; it also accounts for 63% and 29% of 
global capacity respectively for the belt and road components (Wang, 2015, pp. 94–
98). 
 








 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (see later) 
 China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor 
 New Eurasian Land Bridge 
 China-Central-Asia-West-Asia Corridor 
 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor 






 Chongqing as the ‘logistic gateway’ that connect 
western China to Germany by the Yu-Xin-Ou Railway 
 Khorgos Gateway on the Kazakh-Chinese border 




(Source: Author’s own compilation) 
 
Second, the building of this geoeconomic imaginary is deeply intertwined with China’s 
reorientation of its foreign policy rhetoric from promoting ‘peaceful rise and harmonious 
world’ (Lam, 2009; Shirk, 2008) to ‘peaceful development and Chinese Dream’ 
destinies/destined to build a ‘new type of great power relations’ (Hartig, 2016, p. 22-
28; Yi, 2014). In response to the Obama Administration’s policy, announced in 2011, 
to ‘Pivot towards the Asia-Pacific, Wang Ji-Si (2013), a leading Chinese expert, 
proposed in late 2012 to avoid confrontation with the USA by undertaking a ‘March 
Westward’ strategy (Clarke, 2016, p. 19). This proposal and its subsequent 
reinvention of an OBOR-related Eurasia possibility were not without its analogous 




Specifically, one of the ‘fathers of geopolitics’ and a fervent champion of the British 
Empire, Halford Mackinder, formulated his Eurasian ‘Heartland Thesis’ in 1904 
(Mackinder, 1904). By linking power to space, he suggested that the ‘Eurasian’ 
landmass is the most advantageous geopolitical location for military and industrial 
development. Countries that dominate this pivotal ‘heartland’ would possess the 
geopolitical and geoeconomic potentials to dominate the world. Similar themes were 
proposed in German geopolitical analyses (e.g., Haushofer, 1941; Ratzel, 1940, 
1987), although these fell from favour because of their association with Nazism. In 
contrast, Mackinder’s heartland thesis has proved a popular geopolitical metaphor. It 
has provided a theoretical rationale for strategies of territorial-expansion and imperial 
governmental technologies (Morozova, 2014). It is also counter-posed to the Eurasian 
heartland’s main rival – the maritime sphere that includes Western Europe, North 
America, Maritime East Asia, Australia, and the Mediterranean littoral. 
 
Unsurprisingly, China’s OBOR project to create a contiguous Eurasian space by 
leveraging geoeconomic networks has been compared to Mackinder’s analysis and 
its geostrategic implications. New fear-based geopolitical discourses emerged in the 
international arena. For example, Clarke, writing for The Diplomat, saw OBOR as ‘a 
realization of Mackinder’s vision’ (2015). The Pacific Perspective (2017) interpreted it 
as an exercise of Chinese ‘informal imperial power’. Such readings interpret OBOR as 
facilitating the creation of a Sinocentric Eurasian system that would be based on 
infrastructure rather than military conquest and that would enable China to build a land 
empire. Interestingly, the One Road can be seen as its Maritime equivalent. Worried 
about the connotations of transferring Mackinder’s space-conquering image to OBOR, 
the Chinese authorities have rejected this analogy. For example, Liu Xiaoming, the 
Chinese ambassador to Britain, denied that the OBOR initiative confirmed Mackinder’s 
thesis (2015). Apart from attempts to distance OBOR imaginary from Mackinder’s 
geopolitical imaginary, academics and policy-makers are reframing it as global ‘gift’ 
based on cooperation and inclusive globalization (Wang, 2015, pp. 103–107; see also 
Liu and Dunford, 2016). Tropes of win-win and ‘community of common destiny’ based 






Translating OBOR into policy objects 
 
The ordering logic of these geopolitical-geoeconomic statecraft and tropes (and their 
contested negotiations) have shaped policy and consultancy discourses since 
OBOR’s official inception in September 2013. Official Chinese channels, 
commissions, business/investment consultancies, think tanks and diplomatic circles 
are all energetically engaged in selectively co-producing, circulating, and normalizing 
OBOR as a set of policy objects and defended it against criticisms. On the promotional 
side, the OBOR identity and creation of a trans-regional land-sea mass are 
spectacularized as ‘opportunities’ to build a win-win, infrastructure-oriented 
community. China Daily, an official organ, hailed this on 6 May 2015 as the ‘second 
biggest geographical discovery in human history after Mackinder’s breakthrough’. The 
re-envisioning of this land-sea mass was praised as a re-awakening of ‘Eurasia’ from 
its 500-year slumber that would facilitate China’s return to centre stage. This imaginary 
was concretized through vision statements and a dedicated web-based platform on 
policies and OBOR news and activities, namely: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/silkroad/index.htm. This euphoria was 
echoed by some business-consultancy sources that praised it as a ‘brilliant plan’ 
(CLSA, 2015) that could ‘export China’s [infrastructural] development blueprint to the 
world’ (Swain, 2014, p. 8) and could ‘stimulate world trade’ (Tan, 2015). The World 
Pensions Council has even seen it as a long-awaited response to a massive 
infrastructure gap created by neoliberal neglect of this key condition for world trade. 
 
There were also critical discourses, however, especially in diplomatic circles. 
Contributors to The Diplomat, which is linked to the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (an influential American think tank), commented that the project 
was ‘China-centred’, ‘at risk of failure’ (Rudolf, 2015) and ‘a geopolitical ‘gamble’ that 
competed with the US for allies (Yale, 2015). India’s Ministry of External Affairs saw it 
as a ‘national Chinese initiative’ that should be opened to multilateral consultation 
(Madan, 2016). One Taiwan source even interpreted this initiative as China’s 
endeavour to ‘dominate Eurasia without a war’ (Lin, 2015). Nonetheless, in providing 
a policy focus, the OBOR imaginary is making the Belt-Road project more visible and 
encouraging actors to calculate how it could create ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘win-win’ 
outcomes based on ‘cooperation’ and ‘trust and respect’ around cooperation and 
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connectivity. This fits with official discourse about OBOR’s potential to align different 
local, regional, national, and trans-regional strategies and interests. These claims are 
staged and repeated in national and (trans-)regional official speeches, public forums, 
(e.g., Belt and Road Forum 2017 in Beijing), cooperation intentions (e.g., the EU’s 
Juncker plan, named after Jean-Claude Juncker when he was the European 
Commission President) and state visits (e.g., Xi’s visit to Central and Eastern Europe 
in June 2016). By 2016, major think tanks, investment consultancies and the 
international organizations have produced their own knowledge products in the form 
of promotional/assessment reports and blogs on this scheme (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Knowledge Production and the Making of One Belt One Road as a 





Example(s) Title and Year of Report 
Think tanks Chatham House (UK) 
Tim Summers, What Exactly is ‘One Belt 




Patrick Bessler, China's "New Silk Road": 




David Dollar, China's Rise as a Regional 
and Global Power: The AIIB and the 'One 




Peter Cai. Understanding China’s One Belt 
One Road Initiative (2017) 
 
S. Rajaratnam School 
of International 
Studies (Singapore) 
Alessandro Arduino, China’s One Belt One 





World Bank China’s One Belt One Road Initiative (2015) 
 European Parliament 
One Belt One Road (OBOR): China’s 





China’s New Silk Road: the Long and 
Winding Road (2016) 
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McKinsey & Co. 
BNP Paribas 
Investment Partners 
GII Beijing: Navigating One Belt One Road 
(2015) 
One Belt One Road: One Stone Kills Three 
Birds (2015) 
(Source: Author’s own compilation based on web research) 
 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE AS A MODE OF GROWTH AND LOAN-DEBT INVESTMENT 
 
These negotiated ensembles of hope-based knowledge on OBOR not only shape 
subjectivities and their relations across time-space but also contribute to building 
institutions and interest-related coalitions centred upon infrastructure building, 
financing and security. As part of its ‘Go Out’ strategy, a China-oriented infrastructural 
mode of growth (Hildyard, 2016, p. 26) with a (trans-)regional spatial reach is emerging 
in the shadow of global capitalism. It helps to manage China’s triple bubbles by 
prolonging accumulation in two main ways: (1) mobilizing what amounts to a new 
stimulus package with the potential to export infrastructure-related excess capacity 
(e.g., building materials, technological know-how, manpower, etc.) as well as extend 
global supply chains and enhance geopolitical anchorages; and (2) deploying old and 
developing new loan-debt investment and practices to finance OBOR projects. Three 
inter-related configurations are being developed to govern OBOR-related 
accumulation. They concern the production of infra- and info-structures; finance; and 
security respectively. Each involves various ministries, commissions, SOEs, SOBs, 
provincial/local governments, and educational/training/security setups in various 
partnerships and compromise with private and regional/global institutions that govern 
relations among territories, places, scales, and networks. 
 
Three OBOR governance configurations: production, finance and security 
 
The first configuration involves the governance of the export-oriented production 
arrangements that help alleviate China’s overcapacities in infrastructural building 
material and related engineering, technological know-how/standards and workforce. 
The partners in governance comprise a panoply of Chinese ministries, planning 
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commissions, embassies, provincial/city governments, infrastructure-focused SOEs 
(e.g., China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited), private firms (e.g., 
Huawei in telecommunications) and local partners (see Table 4). They are building 
infrastructural/energy projects (e.g., highways, port construction and operation, high-
speed trains, information highways, surveillance systems, power plants, logistic 
centres, agricultural estates, entertainment resorts, etc.) that provide them with 
contracts to absorb China’s excess capacities; and they are also extending their global 
production, trade, and resource chains. There are many such projects. I will illustrate 
some key features below from the flagship project of China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC). 
 
Table 4 Production Configuration of the ‘One Belt One Road’  
Governance 
Configuration 
Nature of the 
Configuration 
Some Main National 
Institutions Involved 


















• Highways, bridges, 
ports, harbours, 
airports, power 










Building material and 
know-how 
• Steel, iron, cement, 









telecommunication links  
• information technology 
(IT) equipment and 
telecommunication 
system (e.g., fibre optic 
cables, , broadband, 
 
Highways, bridges and real 
estate 
• Ministries of Construction 
and Transport 
• China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation 
Ltd. 
• China Communication 
Construction Co. Ltd. 
 
Engineering services 
•  China National Materials 
• // China Machinery 
Engineering Corporation  
 
Steel 





Railway engineering and 
manufacturers 
• China Railway Rolling 
Stock Corporation 
 
Ministry of Communication  




















• SANY Heavy 
Industry Co. Ltd. 




























Port operation and cargo 
transportation 








(Source: Author’s own compilation) 
This production configuration is supported by a second governance configuration, 
focused on finance. Efforts were stepped up to develop what amounted to another 
round of stimulus package based on loan-debt investment to absorb excess capacities 
and acquire strategic resources/influence. The ultimate aim is to internationalize the 
use of Renminbi (see Table 5). According to Xinhua Finance (2015), the OBOR 
initiative requires at least US$ 800 billion annually between 2015 and 2025. Most 
projects are led by infrastructural and energy SOEs funded from a fusion of trade 
finance, loans, grants, and credits issued by policy banks (e.g., China Development 
Bank), SOBs and the New Silk Road Infrastructure Fund (see Table 6). Other 
investment comes from provincial governments/banks, in partnership with SOEs, 
which provide loans to export excess capacities and acquire foreign assets. Given the 
huge amount of funds required, it also involves turning infrastructure into an asset 
class and attracting other investment through: (1) (un-)listed funds and bond issuances 
on major stock exchanges (e.g., OBOR Bond in Singapore); (2) private-public 
partnerships; and (3) three new (inter-)governmental funds, etc. (see Tables 5 and 6). 
 
Table 5 Financial Configuration of the ‘One Belt One Road’  
Governance 
Configuration 
Nature of the Configuration 
Some Main National 
Institutions Involved 












debt burden  
 




Grants by policy banks 
Loans from policy banks and 
SOBs 
• Funding for infrastructural 
investment in ports, roads, rail 
and resources 
 
• Ministry of Commerce 
• SOEs (after mergers 
and acquisitions) 
 
• State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange 
• Policy banks (e.g., 
Bank of China, China 
Development Bank, 
China Ex-Im Bank) 
 












• Silk Road Fund (see Table 6) 
• Loan/debt contractuality (see 
later) 
• Debt into equity 
 
Infrastructure as a new asset 
class from non-public funding 
• Unlisted equity funds 
• Listed equity funds on stock 
exchanges (e.g., Shanghai-
Hong Kong Stock Connect) 
• Bonds (e.g., RMB bond, 
OROR bond in Singapore and 
China-Hong Kong Bond 
Connect) 
• Private-public partnerships 
(PPPs). 
 
From inter-governmental funds 




Internationalization of Renminbi 
(RMB) 
• RMB as denominating 
currency in bond issuance  
• RMB in trade settlement 
• RMB swap mechanism 
 
• SOBs and SOEs 








• Bank of China 








• Silk Road Fund 
• Asian Infrastructural 
Investment Bank  
• New Development 
Bank  
 
• Ministry of Finance 
• State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange 








• Stock exchanges 


















• RMB clearing 
centres worldwide 




(Source: Author’s own compilation) 
 
Three major financial institutions have been established: The Silk Road Fund, the New 
Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (see Table 
6). Whilst the first is state-owned, the second is more BRICS-driven, and the third is 
even more multilateral. The AIIB was established in October 2014 with 77 countries 
signing up by May 2017. Its authorized capital is US$ 100 billion with half from China. 
As an emergent multilateral infrastructural bank, it works with International Financial 
Corporation (member of the World Bank) and its regional counterparts (e.g., Asian 
Development Bank). It also mobilizes and co-ordinate inter-governmental support to 
raise semi-commercialized loans from sovereign funds, pension/insurance funds, etc. 
To this end, public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a financing method are widely 
discussed and promoted in China to enable the sharing of risks and returns for the 






































• Earmarked for OBOR 
infrastructural projects  
• An initial capital of US$ 10 billion 
• Another US$ 6.5 billion from 
China’s foreign exchange 
reserves 








































• Funding for infrastructures that 
are not under sovereign credit   
• Promotion of PPP method in 
expanding funding (e.g., pension 
funds) 
• Managing projects by sharing 
risks and returns with the private 
sector 
• Enforcement of contracts 























• Infrastructural projects in BRICS 
as priority 
• Each country select its own 
infrastructural projects to be 
developed 
 
Note: BRICS = Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(Source: Author’s own compilation) 
 
Third, contrary to the financial arrangement, the place-based production configuration 
faces continuous security challenges, especially in some divided or contested 
territories along the Belt. For example, the flagship CPEC project, which builds 
infrastructural links between Kashgar (in China’s Xinjiang Province) and Pakistan’s 
port in Gwadar, passes through Balochistan for access to the Arabian Sea and by-
passes the Malacca Strait. However, Balochistan has been affected over decades by 
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nationalist-separatist struggles against the Pakistan army. Worried that the CPEC is 
another attempt to grab Baloch’s resources and dispossess local people (e.g., 
fisherfolk in Gwadar port and ordinary citizens from their homes due to land 
development) (Pal, 2017, p. 4), separatists are attacking oil tankers, gas pipelines and 
Chinese workers. Similar attacks (e.g., Juba in Sudan) and less violent security issues 
(e.g., labour disputes and thefts) occur elsewhere (e.g., the dock strike in Piraeus, 
Greece). All these incidents indicate the need to ‘go out’ safely by enhancing security 
protection and intensifying anti-terrorist policy. In response, a new security 
configuration is emerging with Chinese private security firms/operatives, global 
providers and local counterparts cooperate/jostle to guard Chinese pipelines, railways, 
power plants and workers in divided or contested territories (Goh,  Martina and 
Shepherd, 2017). Where the military is already active, governments may make forces 
and intelligence available.  For example, in 2017, the Pakistan state has created a 
12,000-strong special security division to defend the CPEC project (Rifaat and Maini, 
2016, p. 14) (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7 Security Configuration of ‘One Belt One Road’  
Governance 
Configuration 
Nature of the 
Configuration 
Some Main National 
Institutions Involved 












Provision of security 
services with support from  
local teams 
 
Provision of security 




• Chinese security firms 
(e.g., Dewei Security) 
run by personnel with 
military backgrounds 
• In Pakistan, special army 
division to ensure 
protection 
• China-Pakistan land and 





• Global security firms 
such as Frontier 
Security Group 





related projects in 
Southeast Asia 
 







OBOR’s emerging uneven and contradictory multi-spatial development 
 
These emerging configurations are developing and realigning production, finance and 
security under a more ambitious, multi-spatial round of loan-debt investment. Their 
activities are mediated transnationally by China’s SOEs/SOBs, provincial 
governments, private firms, signatory (sub-)national governments, national/multilateral 
development funds, development agencies, international/regional organizations, 
investment consultancies, commercial banks, insurers, stock exchanges, security 
firms, and military agencies across territories, places, scales, and networks. Examples 
of multi-scalar aspects of the project include how OBOR is being appropriated by local 
and regional governments in China to deal with their own issues of loss of 
competitiveness, declining population and inequalities. In China’s northeast region 
(Dongbei), which has no historical relation with the Silk Road, these local/regional 
governments are joining the OBOR bonanza thanks to the Chang-Ji-Tu project. This 
connects efforts in Hunchun in China’s Juli Province to build special economic zones 
to link with North Korea that can then be articulated to OBOR’s China-Mongolia-
Russia-Economic Corridor. Likewise, at the national scale, since the inauguration of 
the President Moon in South Korea in 2017, the government has formulated the New 
Northern Policy to identify new economic opportunities (e.g., building railways and 
seaports) across the Arctic route. South Korea would thereby engage both with 
China’s OBOR and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union projects to experiment with 
new scalar connections.4 
 
These emerging imaginaries and associated policies and projects, with their trial-and-
error multi-spatial (especially multi-scalar) modes of governance, provide the basis for 
new infrastructural mode of growth that operates in the shadow of global capitalism 
and thus must address diverse geopolitical challenges (Jessop and Sum, 2018). Here 
we find new projects (e.g., South Korea’s New Northern Policy in preceding 
paragraph) as well as more established ones (e.g., CPEC discussed above) 
contributing to this mode of growth. Nonetheless, as this China-centred mode 
develops and absorbs more production and financial capital, it intensifies and spreads 
at least three kinds of contradictory and antagonistic development. First, on the 
production front, the drive to export China’s overcapacity problems abroad engender 
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struggles at accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2009) as the pursuit of OBOR 
projects displaces local workers, economic groups and communities through job, land 
and resource grabs that have serious distributive, environmental and security 
implications. As the CPEC case indicates, OBOR was narrated as a growth projects; 
but it mainly benefits large corporate-military concerns at the expense of domestic 
small- and medium-sized industries (Chakraborty, 2017). Other issues include labour 
and ethnic conflicts between Chinese management and local labour, the destruction 
of protected forests and traditional fishing communities, and separatist attacks (Dawn, 
2017; UNESCAP, 2017) (see above). 
 
Second, financially, the push to export overcapacities and develop connectivity has 
produced contradictory developments within China. Investment in OBOR has become 
a pervasive theme for China’s national economic planning agency, subnational 
governments, city regions, universities and many other authorities and institutions 
(Cai, 2017). For example, Chongqing Municipality narrates itself as a ‘megacity’ and 
focuses on creating the capacities and facilities to become an OBOR free trade zone. 
Zhejiang Province concentrates on developing maritime services. But such OBOR-
related projects intensify China’s overcapacity problems and some new funding is 
even used to service old debts, thereby deepening the already heavily indebted (sub-
)national governments rather than contributing towards investments. 
 
Third, depending on transnational networking and the governance mechanisms of the 
receiving countries, projects are not always transparent or evaluated fully in risk 
assessment terms. In the main, China’s OBOR loans, contrary to Washington 
Consensus type IMF-World Bank loans, which operate according to multilateral 
‘structural-adjustment’ and ‘good governance’ conditionalities (Babb, 2012), rely more 
on ‘loan-debt contractuality’.5 This contractuality rests on tailor-made bilateral (some 
multilateral) loan framework agreements made with SOEs/SOBs, China Construction 
Bank, the Silk Road Fund, etc. As legal-disciplinary techniques, contracts regulate and 
normalize relevant financial and material relations by stipulating: (1) the amount, 
purpose, duration and concentration of loans; (2) manner of repayment, loan ceilings 
and the nature of credit lines; (3) the duration of grace periods and subsequent interest 
rate arrangements; (4) the sovereign share of the loans and maturity periods; (5) the 
amount and manner of private investment; (6) the exchange rate and loan proportions 
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denominated in US dollar, Renminbi, and other currencies; (7) the extent and use of 
Chinese resources and manpower; (8) provisions for use/control of the infrastructure; 
(9) guarantees and events of default; (10) arbitration mechanisms; and so on (Zhang 
and Millar, 2017). Should this contractual relationship end in defaults, the loan-debt 
obligations allow China to renegotiate the terms, collateralize the debt and claim 
assets/resources by converting debt into equity.  
 
Sri Lanka is a good example of some aspects of this loan-debt contractuality. Its 
government owed China a total of USD 8 billion in 2017 including USD 301 million for 
building the Hambantota Port. China provides a 4-year grace period but charges 6.3 
percent for the port loan, which compares with the World Bank interest rates of 
between 0.25 to 3 percent for similar projects (Graceffo, 2017). In addition, with the 
slackening of the Sri Lankan economy and declining demand for its port services, its 
national government has racked up losses of USD 300 million and a debt-servicing 
cost of USD 50 million in 2017. Following the governance logic of loan-debt 
contractuality, China, instead of rescheduling the debt, offered another USD 1.1 
million to convert this debt into equity. This power asymmetry has enabled China 
Merchant Port Holdings (International) Co. Ltd. to acquire 70 percent of the 
Hambantota port, including a 99-year lease for a surrounding industrial zone (Dutta, 
2017). The extension and unevenness of these loan-debt arrangements are resisted 
by diverse Sri Lankan groups because of corruption charges, the loss of land and local 
livelihood around the port area as well as geopolitical worries of China gaining 
maritime access in the Indian Ocean competing for influence, trade and energy. 
 
Similar geoeconomic and geopolitical challenges related to bilateral loan-debt 
contractuality are emerging in Pakistan, Cambodia, Myanmar, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Malaysia, etc. (Chaudhury, 2017; Sheehan, 2017; Venkatachalam, 2017). Chellaney 
described its potential predatory effects as ‘debt trap diplomacy’ that put financially-
fragile partners in debt under increasing Chinese leverage (2017) via a virtual ‘bait and 
switch’ manoeuvre. Seen in more political economy terms, China, in relieving its own 
triple bubbles via OBOR, is intensifying its own debt burdens partly because of the 
sheer size, security threats and weak risk management tools used in assessing OBOR 
projects. Looking beyond China, it is spreading the debt burden abroad as the loan-
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debt investment adds to the vicious debt cycles of some developing countries and may 
compel them to make geoeconomic/geopolitical concessions. 
 
This emerging transnational social relation is raising concerns for capital and states 
alike. On 21 September 2017, Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings, worried 
about the increasing debt load in China, downgraded its long-term sovereign 
ratings form ‘AA-’ to ‘A+’ (Partington, 2017).  The Indian state communicates its 
sovereignty anxiety as CPEC cuts through the Gilgit-Baltistan borderland area of 
Kashmir over which India claims sovereignty. In addition, China’s debt-levered 
expropriations (e.g., Sri Lanka’s Hambantota and Pakistan’s Gwadar ports) 
intensify the geoeconomic-geopolitical struggles for other regional ports/transport 
corridors (e.g., Iran’s Chabahar) by India and Japan. New Delhi, dissatisfied with the 
territorial challenges coming from the CPEC project, boycotted China’s Belt and Road 
Forum that occurred on 14-15 May 2017. In cooperation with Japan, it advances its 
Chabahar project and constructs alternative imaginaries (e.g., Asia-Africa Growth 
Corridor which is a new sea route connecting Indian, African and Southeast Asian 
ports) (Beri, 2017). Likewise, Mohamad Mahathir, on returning to office as the Prime 
Minister of Malaysia in May 2018, cancelled two OBOR-related infrastructural projects 
three months later because of rising worries over their rising debt burden and his 
conviction that the deals are too favourable to China. And, in July 2018, the US joined 
the geostrategic search for alternative spatial fixes in the region by promoting an Indo-




This article deploys a critical discursive-cum-material approach to examine the 
dialectical intertwining of geoeconomics and geopolitics as multiple players, 
encouraged by the Chinese party leadership and state as they seek to reorder key 
socio-spatial features of the world market. Responding to the 2008 global financial 
crisis, the Chinese government promoted a stimulus package and policies to increase 
liquidity and demand. This reinforced overcapacities and intensified the triple bubbles. 
As the new Xi-Li leadership went into crisis-management mode, ‘Likonomics’ proved 
less resonant than Xi’s ‘new normal’ discourse and OBOR. Discursively, OBOR builds 
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on the earlier ‘Go West’ and ‘Go Out’ policies and uses a panoply of rhetorical and 
visualization techniques to consolidate support for this new imaginary. Thus, as a 
spatial fix, OBOR is mediated by hope and fear discourses that energize actions. 
Materially, this spatial fix launches another stimulus package that can displace China’s 
triple bubbles abroad by creatively rearticulating sociospatial organizations, 
infrastructure development, financing mechanisms, and security protection. Yet it also 
intensifies unevenness, contradictions and conflicts of interest that arise from China’s 
displacement of overcapacity and spreads debt burden abroad. New geoeconomic 
practices of bilateral loan-debt contractuality deepen debt traps, especially in some 
financially-fragile developing countries. This allows China to acquire geostrategic 
infrastructure at the expense of some developing countries that are locked into vicious 
debt cycles. These infrastructural expropriations not only intensify local resistance; 
they also accentuate geopolitical-geoeconomic counter-tendencies along pre-existing 
security fault-lines and struggles for resources. This is reflected in the emergence and 
consolidation of a governance configuration around security to complement the 
governance configurations around production and finance. I illustrated this by 
considering the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as one instance of the dialectical 
intertwining of China’s geoeconomic-connectivity hope to export overcapacity and the 
geopolitical-geoeconomic struggles for spatialization coming from the worries of 
China’s debt-levered expropriations of regional geostrategic sites/resources/influence. 
In this way, I have suggested that an affective turn sensitive to hope and fear 
discourses can provide a more nuanced account of the energies that are involved in 





1 The ‘One Belt One Road’ was renamed by China as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ 
(BRI) in the Belt and Road Forum held between 14 to 15 May 2017.  
2 Sparke’s ‘double vision’ can be elaborated by showing how the interaction of 
discursive, structural, technological and agential selectivities condenses 
geoeconomic and geopolitical imaginaries and practices into specific spatio-temporal 
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fixes (for the theoretical arguments on cultural political economy and other cases, 
see Sum and Jessop, 2013). 
3 By mid–2009, there were at least 3,800 LGFVs at the provincial, prefectural, and 
even county/city district levels (Meng, 2009). 
4 The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer on the Chang-tu-ji projects 
and South Korea’s New Northern Policy. 
5 Loan-debt contractuality takes many forms. In China, initial loans mainly come from 
policy banks, SOBs and special funds. Contracts can then be extended via 
consortium loans; joint private equity; and joint debt issuance. 
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